

Message Text

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45

ACTION NEA-06

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 PM-03 NSC-10 NSCE-00 CIAE-00

INR-10 NSAE-00 RSC-01 DODE-00 EUR-10 PRS-01 DRC-01

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P R 101155Z OCT 73

FM AMEMBASSY KABUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5410

INFO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

S E C R E T KABUL 7242

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PINT, AF, IR, PK

SUBJECT: AFGHAN-PAK-IRANIAN RELATIONS

REF: STATE 197358

1. AT FOREIGN OFFICE DINNER OCTOBER 6, DEPFONMIN WAHID ABDULLAH ASKED CHARGE TO SEE HIM NEXT EVENING ON SEVERAL "IMPORTANT MATTERS." (OTHER SUBJECTS SEPTTEL.) AS KEY SUBJECT IN CONVERSATION OCTOBER 7, ABDULLAH MADE STRONG APPEAL FOR USG TO "ADVISE YOUR GOOD FRIEND, THE SHAH, NOT TO INVOLVE HIMSELF IN THE BALUCHISTAN PROBLEM." ABDULLAH SAID AFGHANS FULLY AWARE IRAN HAS SENT 12 HELICOPTERS, 25 PLANES, TROOPS (READ "GENDARMERIE"), AND SENIOR SAVAK OFFICIALS TO ASSIST PAKISTANIS IN BALUCHISTAN, A COURSE OF ACTION WHICH HE CHARACTERIZED AS "VERY DANGEROUS." WHEN PRESSED HARD ON RELIABILITY OF INFORMATION, HE INSISTED GOA SOURCES WERE "COMPLETELY RELIABLE."

2. ABDULLAH REITERATED STATEMENT TO ME MADE AT OUR LAST MEETING THAT PROBLEM SHOULD BE LEFT TO PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN TO HANDLE "BILATERALLY" WITHOUT ANY "OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE." HE URGED USG, AS CLOSE FRIEND AND ALLY OF BOTH PAKISTAN AND IRAN, TO COUNSEL BOTH
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SHAH AND BHUTTO THAT A "TOUGH LINE" ON BALUCHISTAN AND THE NWFP

"WILL NOT WORK," AND THAT IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY UNWISE TO "PROVOKE AFGHANS." (ALTHOUGH HE REFERRED TO BOTH SHAH AND BHUTTO, IN THIS CONVERSATION ABDULLAH WAS CONCENTRATING ON IRAN.) HE SAID GOA HAS TRIED IN EVERY WAY POSSIBLE TO SHOW IT WANTS GOOD RELATIONS WITH IRAN AND HE IMPLIED STRONGLY GOA EXPECTS EVENTUALLY TO GO AHEAD WITH THE HELMAND TREATY. BUT, HE CONTINUED, "THE SHAH MUST UNDERSTAND THAT ENCOURAGING AND HELPING BHUTTO TO PROVOKE US MAKES IT EXCEEDINGLY HARD FOR US TO CONTINUE THIS POSTURE. PLEASE TELL HIM." HE SAID HE WAS ALSO TALKING MORE INDIRECTLY ALONG THESE LINES WITH THE IRANIAN AMBASSADOR, WHOM, HOWEVER, "HE DID NOT TRUST AT ALL AND COULD NOT CONSIDER A RELIABLE CHANNEL FOR COMMUNICATION." THEREFORE HE URGED US ADVISE SHAH DIRECTLY ALONG ABOVE LINES.

3. ABDULLAH SAID GOA HAD "COMPLETE KNOWLEDGE" OF CLOSE CONSULTATION GOING ON IN ISLAMABAD BETWEEN IRANIANS AND PAKISTANIS, AND THAT HE WAS THOROUGHLY AWARE OF A PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM THE SHAH TO BHUTTO, CONVEYED THROUGH ZAHEDI IN SEPTEMBER, WHICH URGED BHUTTO TO TAKE A VERY TOUGH LINE TOWARD AFGHANISTAN AND PROMISED HELP IN FORM OF "SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS." HE SAID GOA ALSO AWARE THAT PAKISTANI AND IRANIAN AMBASSADORS IN KABUL ARE "MEETING ALMOST NIGHTLY BEHIND CLOSED DOORS WITH THEIR KEY STAFF MEMBERS," PRESUMABLY TO COORDINATE STRATEGY. HE CONCLUDED THIS PART OF OUR DISCUSSION WITH A FERVENT PLEA THAT USG ADVISE ITS ALLIES THAT ONLY A POLITICAL ACCOMMODATION, IN BALUCHISTAN AND THE NWFP, NOT A "TOUGH LINE," COULD ASSURE PEACE IN THE REGION.

4. I TOLD ABDULLAH THAT WE HAD IN THE PAST COUNSELLED BHUTTO TO PURSUE PATH OF PEACEFUL ACCOMMODATION AND WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY CONTINUE TO DO SO; HOWEVER, THIS IS A MATTER WHICH HE CLEARLY REGARDS AS AN INTERNAL PAKISTANI PROBLEM, NOT ONE OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, AND HIS SUSCEPTIBILITY TO OUR COUNSEL IS QUITE LIMITED. AS FAR AS OFFERING ADVICE TO SHAH, I SAID I WOULD REPORT HIS REQUEST FAITHFULLY BUT THAT I COULD GIVE NO ASSURANCE AS TO WHAT WE MIGHT OR MIGHT NOT DO.

5. IN LIGHT OF TURN CONVERSATION HAD TAKEN, I TOOK OPPORTUNITY TO TELL HIM WE ASSESSED BHUTTO'S CURRENT POLITICAL POSITION DIFFERENTLY THAN GOA. WE SEE POSSIBILITY HE MAY YET FIND POLITICAL SOLUTION TO PROBLEMS IN FRONTIER PROVINCES, AND IF HE DOES, WE
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BELIEVE HE HAS AMPLE SUPPORT TO MAKE IT STICK (REFTEL).

6. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOLLOW IN SEPTTEL.
LEWIS

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NNN

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